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INTRODUCTION
There's no place for hyperbole in appellate briefs. But Respondent's prevailing party
argument-though good for Solomon Gepford-is downright terrible for debtors generally. It
would increase litigation costs and corresponding attorney fee awards against debtors for two
reasons.
First, to preserve a right to a reasonable attorney fee, Gepford would require collection
agencies to reject payments made to medical providers after suit is filed-litigating all cases to

judgment or formal settlement for the full amount owed To show why that's true, it's important

to compare what Medical Recovery Services, LLC ("Medical Recovery'') did below, with
Gepford's rule-embraced by the lower courts.
After the Jawsuit began, Gepford paid his medical provider the full amount Medical
Recovery sought in its comp1aint. As soon as Medical Recovery found out, it credited the payment
to Gepford's account and sought to advance the litigation to judgment so that the Cowt could

adjudicate a reasonable attorney fee and prejudgment interest.
Gepford asks the Court to treat the payment to his medical provider as somehow different
from a payment to Medical Recovery. Indeed, he asserts that paying his medical provider didn't
benefit Medical Recovery at all, so it cannot make Medical Recovery the prevailing party. If the
Court adopts that position, collection agencies will be forced to reject payments to providers as
made to the wrong party-continuing the litigation 1llltil the debtor pays the collection agency or
the court enters judgment. Differentiating between collection agencies and their medical provider
clients only makes things more confusing for debtors. And requiring more litigation over these
issues only adds to debtors' potential attorney fee liability. Neither situation is good for debtors,
who often appear pro se.
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The second problem with Gepford's argument has impacts for prevailing party analysis
generally-not just debt collection actions. Allowing courts to determine prevailing party status
based on prelitigation conduct or other facts extraneous to the relative success of the parties on the
claims in the action would add greater expense and uncertainty to the prevailing party analysis.
Whether the issue is prelitigation settlement efforts, post litigation likehbood of collection, or
something else-parties would need discovery on any number of otherwise extraneous matters to
argue that a party received little vahre from its otherwise successful lawsuit.
For good reason, the Idaho Code, rules of civil procedure, and rules of evidence reject
Gepford's arguments. This Court should too. Gepford's payment in full to his medical provider
shortly after Medical Recovery sued, together with the favorable prejudgment interest decision,
afforded Medical Recovery everything it sought. Thus, Medical Recovery was a prevailing party
as a matter of law entitled to costs as a matter of right.
As a prevailing party in a case ''to recover on" an unpaid medical services contract, Idaho
Code§ 12-120(3) affords Medical Recovery a reasonable attorney fee. Gepford's argument to the
contrary conflict with well-settled precedent and the plain text of Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 1
As a party pmsuing its right to a reasonable attorney fee in the lawsuit, the law aJso allows
Medical Recovery a reasonable attorney fee on appeal

1 Medical

Recovery intended to appeal only the entitlement to attorney's tees under Idaho Code §
12-120(3). Medical Recovery did not intend to pursue on appeal entitlement to attorney's fees
under Idaho Code § 12-120(1) but inadvertently included that issue on appeal before this Court.
Thus, whether Medical Recovery ''waived" the issue or not is moot because it withdraws any claim
for attorney's fees under § 12-120(1) on this appeal and seeks an award of attorney's fees only
llllder § 12-120(3).
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
4836-9882-1301 v3

2

ARGUMENT

I.

MEDICAL RECOVERY PREVAILED AS A MATTER OF LAW.

No one likes the debt collector. Despite Medical Recovery's collecting 100% of the debt
and prejudgment interest after suing, the District Court denied Medical Recovery prevailing party
status. Even on matters of discretion, courts must correctly apply the legal standard and act within
the boW1ds oflaw. Clarke v. Latimer, 165 Idaho 1, 437 P.3d 1, 6 (2018). When a party receives
"the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved," it is a prevailing party as a matter
of law. Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & PavingJ Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19,
117 P.3d 130, 132-33 (2005) (reversing the district court's prevailing party determination and
remanding only for determination of the amoW1t of the award).
"In baseball, it is said that a walk is as good as a hit. The latter, of course is more exciting."
Id at 719. When the defendant pays the plaintiff before answering the complaint, it's a home run-

affording immediate relief without the added expense of contested proceedings. A later award of
prejudgment interest just runs up the score. The District Court erred in denying Medical Recovery
prevailing party status on these facts. Id. (holding that even "less than tremendous success" on a
counterclaim together with successful defense of the plaintiff's claim made the defendant a
"prevailing party").
Ignoring this straightforward analysis, the District Court erred when it credited four
arguments Gepford reiterates on appeal. (A) The court treated payment to Gepford's medical
provider as though it were different from what Medical Recovery sought. (R. 117-18, 334--35.)2

2

The lower courts made the alternative finding that even if Medical Recovery prevailed, the
reasonable fee would be $0 in attorney fees. (E.g., R. 117.) But the premise of the Court's
alternative conclusion rested on the same analysis as its prevailing party determination. (E.g., R.
117.) This brief frames Medical Recovery's arguments in terms of the lower courts error in
determining the prevailing party, but these arguments apply in equal measure to the alternative
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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(B) It based its prevailing party ana]ysis on prelitigation conduct not the resuh of the action. (R.
117-18, 334-35.) (C) It denied fees due to Medical Recovery's purported lack of diligence in
prelitigation settlement efforts. (R. 117-18, 334-35.) And (D) it clearly erred when it upheld the
Magistrate Court's fmding that Gepford lacked notice of the unpaid bill until after Medical·
Recovery sued (R. 116, 335.)

A.

There is no difference between paying the debt collector and paying the
medical provider. The District Court erred in holding otherwise in its
prevailing party analysis.
1.

The Idaho Collection Agency Act prohibits treating payment to the medical
provider different from payment to its debt collector.

To deny Medical Recovery prevailing party status, Gepford (and the District Court) point
to the $0 summary judgment award and the fact that Gepford paid his medical provider-not
Medical Recovery-in response to the lawsuit. (R. 117-18, 334-35; Resp't Br. at 11-12.) For
example, Gepford asserts that Medical Recovery "failed to recover a single cent as a result of the
lawsuit" because Gepford paid ''the $416 to [his medical provider]"-not Medical Recovery.
(Resp't Br. at 13-14.) ''This alone," Gepford asserts, ''precludes [Medical Recovery] from
invoking prevailing party status." (Resp'tBr. at 13-14.)
To be a prevailing party under Gepford's rule, Medical Recovery had to reject Gepford's
payment because it was made to the wrong party and insist on being paid directly. BonanzaMotors,

Inc. v. Webb, 104 Idaho 234, 236, 657 P .2d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App. 1983) ("The obligor is liable to
the assignee if the funds assigned are subsequently paid to the assignor in violation of the
assignment."). Not so.

conclusion that $0 is a reasonable fee. If the Court reverses the prevailing party decision, it should
also reverse the ahemative conchtsion that a reasonable fee is $0. And the matter should be
remanded for a detennination of a reasonable fee based on the correct legal standard.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Debt collectors are not ordinary assignees. The Idaho Collection Agency Act ("Act")
strictly regulates collection assignments. E.g., Idaho Code § 26-2221 et seq.; Med. Recovery Se,vs.,

LLC v. Strawn, 156 Idaho 153, 156-59 & nn.1-4, 321 P .3d 703, 706-09 & nn.1-4 (2014) (noting
regu]ation on everything from fees collected to the tenns of prejudgment settlement agreements).
Unlike traditional assignees, Medical Recovery does ''not step into the shoes of [its creditor
clients]" when it receives an assignment for collection purposes. Strawn, 156 Idaho at 158, 321

P. 3d at 708. Instead, a debt collection assignment authomes the debt collector to seek payment for
the original creditor. See id. Even when payments go directly to collection agencies, it's not their
money. Purco FleetServs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep't of Fin., 140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 P.3d 346,351

(2004) ("An assignee for collection holds any proceeds of the assigned cJaim in trust for the
assignor."). Every penny must go into a trust accmmt. See Idaho Code § 26-2233. There's even a
boruling requirement to ensure compliance. Id. § 26-2232.

This encompasses "all moneys collected on behalf of such creditor clients" and all
"payments made to such creditor clients ... ."Id.§ 26-2234(5) (emphasis added) (requiring written
statements of such collections ''within thirty (30) days following the end of each calendar month").
In other words, whether Gepford paid Medical Recovery or his medical provider-Medical
Recovery had a duty to accowit for the payment. See id.
To be frank, if Medical Recovery had sought more than a $0 judgment on the principal
debt after Gepford paid the full amount to his provider, it'd be committing a felony. Id. § 262238(1) ("Any person who ... misappropriate, transfers, or converts to his own use or benefit,

funds belonging to or held for another person, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony .... ").

It would also breach its statutory duty to "deal openly, fairly, and honestly without deception in"
its collection efforts. Id. § 26-2229A.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Thus, the Act cuts off Gepford's argument that you can distinguish Medical Recovery from
its creditor client. Medical Recovery collects for its client. Strawn, 156 Idaho at 158, 321 P .3d at
708. When its client gets paid 100% of the money Gepford owed, Medical Recovery prevails. The
$0 sunnnary judgment recognizes the fact of this payment and advances the proceedings to the
attorney fee and prejudgment interest phase, without unnecessary litigation. It woukln't be fair,
open, or honest to do otherwise. Idaho Code§ 26-2229A(l). The Court should reverse the District
Court's decision. Medical Recovery is a prevailing party and the Court should remand for

a

determination of a reasonable amount of attorney fees.

2.

If debt collectors can't count payments to the medical provider as success
in the prevailing party analysis, they will be forced to reject these payments
and continue litigating cases to judgment-increasing debtors' potential
attorney fee liability.

Despite the conflict with Idaho collection law, Gepford asks the Court to adopt Oklahoma's
rule in Tulsa Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Calnan, 2018 OK 60, 427 P .3d 1050, 1052. Calnan is on

all fours factually with this case: "shortly after [defendant] Calnan was served a copy of [the debt
collection action], Calnan paid his debt in full." Id. at 1051. (Resp't Br. at 15-16 (quoting this
passage).) The creditor sought summary judgment and attorney fees-but the Oklahoma Supreme
Court rejected its claim-holding that the voluntary payment mooted its claim and deprived it of
prevailing party status. See id. at 1051-52. Advising creditors in future cases, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that creditors ''may reject [a debtor's post litigation] payment and seek to have
the same awarded by judicial decision, in which case-should the [creditors] prevail----they will

be entitled to seek a fee award" Id. at 1052 n 7.
Oklahoma's rule is good for Gepford, but terrible precedent for debtors generally. It forces
creditors to reject tender of full payment after suing to preserve their right to attorney fees. Id. at
1051-52 ("[Creditor's] claims in this case may very well be fee-bearing ... [,] but [t]o qualify as

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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such, the statute requires [creditor] to have prevailed on those fee-bearing claims, meaning that
[creditor] must first have obtained a judgment in its favor on those claims before it could be eligible
for an attorney-fee award.").
It's also bad for medical providers-and any other industry that provides goods or services
without advance payment. Debtors have little incentive to pay bills on time when there's no penalty
for waiting until the creditor (or its collection agent) files a lawsuit.
Fortunately, Oklahoma's rule is barred by the Act. See supra Section I.A. l. It's also
precluded by this Court's precedent on the prevailing party standard. In Oklahoma, "'[p]revailing
party[]' [is] a legal term of art" that "means the successful party who has been awarded some relief
on the merits of his or her claim." Calnan, 2018 OK 60, 427 P .3d at 1052 n.6. Idaho Jaw takes a
broader view. There is no 'judgment" requirement to be a prevailing party in Idaho. In.deed, the
Court doesn't even have to render a merits decision on any claim to determine the prevailing party.
Idaho Jaw directs courts to consider "the fmal judgment or result of the action in relation to the

relief sought by the respective parties." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Whether settlement or voluntary
payment, Idaho law recognizes that obtaining ''the relief sought'' is essential to prevailing party
status-not a specific disposition on the merits. E.g., Clarke v. Latimer, 165 Idaho 1,437 P.3d 1,
6 (2018) (recognizing that "in the right case" the Court should "consider the 'result' obtained by
way of settlement'' (citation omitted)). 3

3

See also Bolger v. Lance, 131 Idaho 792, 797 (2002) ( "As noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals,
it may be appropriate for the trial court, in the right case, to consider the 'result' obtained by way
of a settlement reached by the parties"); Jerry J. Joseph C.L. U. Ins. Associates, Inc. v. Vaught, 117
Idaho 555 (Ct. App. 1990) (affirming decision of trial court that defendant was sole prevailing
party when the defendant entered into settlement agreeing to all the substantive relief sought in the
plaintiff's complaint); La,dd v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250 (Ct. App. 1983) (affll1lling trial court's
determination that the p1aintiff was the prevailing party under a settlement agreement without the
p1aintiff's having ftrst obtained a monetary judgment). Gepford notes that there was no settlement
agreement, c1aiming these cases do not apply. (Resp't Br. at 14 n.2). But he doesn't give any
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Thus, Idaho law rightly rejects the Oklahoma rule. Debt collectors cannot "reject" a
debtor's payment once a lawsuit is filed. See Idaho Code § 26-2229A(l); supra Section I.A.I. A
debt collector does not forfeit a right to attorney fees when a lawsuit motivates the debtor to pay
the "relief sought by the [compJaint]." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). Indeed, this Court "emphasize[d] that
attorney fees are available to debt collection agencies Wlder [Idaho Code] § 26-2229A( 4),
provided the fee sought falls within one of the five enwnerated categories." Strawn, 156 Idaho at
158,321 P.3dat708. 4
Medical Recovery got what it wanted when Gepford paid his provider. The $0 summary
judgment appropriately credited Gepford's post-filing payment, without impacting Medical
Recovery's prevailing party status. The lower courts were not free to disregard Gepford' s
voluntary payment of the precise amollllt Medical Recovery sought in its complaint or the
prejudgment interest also awarded. 5 This Court should reverse the District Cow1 and hold that
Medical Recovery prevailed as a matter of law.

B.

Idaho law limits prevailing party analysis to the "action"-not prelitigation
conduct.

Gepford offers a second reason to deny Medical Recovery prevailing party status: it
"incurred fees and costs only as a result of its own 'lack of diligence."' (Resp't Br. at 12 (citing R.

reasoned analysis for that statement. Like a settlement, Gepford's voluntary payment afforded
Medical Recovery the relief it sought without a court ruling on the merits. There is no logical
distinction between Gepford's payment and a settlement followed by an attorney fee motion.
4

The fn-st of the enumerated categories of appropriate fees are those "expressly authorized by
statute." Idaho Code § 26-2229A(4)(a). Idaho Code §12-120(3) provides attorney fees for suits
''to recover on" a "contract relating to the purchase or sale of ... services .... " Id.; infra Section
II.
5

E.g., R. 117-18, 334--35. Gepford's argument that Medical Recovery achieved nothing, Resp't
Br. at 11-12, improperly ignores the benefit Gepford's voluntary payment conferred on Medical
Recovery and the favorable award of prejudgment interest. (R. 332 (identifying prejudgment
interest was included in the fmal judgment below).)
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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118)). Gepford argues that he "was not 'afforded the opportunity to pay the bill' because [Medical
Recovery] 'sent notices to an incorrect and non-existent address.'" (Resp't Br. at 12 (quoting R.
118).) This argument is wrong, on both the 1aw and the facts.
1.

Prevailing party status does not turn on prelitigation conduct.

Rule 54(d)(l)(B) directs courts to consider "all of the issues and claims involved in the

action"-not prelitigation

conduct. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)

(emphasis

added).

Considering

pre litigation conduct in its prevailing party analysis, the District Court erred "as a matter of law."

Clarke v. Latimer, 165 Idaho 1, 5-6, 437 P .3d 1, 5-6 (2018). Like the district court in Clarke v.
Latimer, here, the lower courts improperly analyz.ed facts outside the action to minimiz.e the degree
of success Medical Recovery obtained on its single c1aim for relief in the suit. (R. 117-18, 33435.) In Clarke, it was the plaintiff's earlier judgment against a spouse that caused the court to fmd
the plaintiff's success "largely inconsequential." Clarke, 165 Idaho at 6, 437 P.3d at 6. Given the
earlier judgment, the court feh the "net effect" of the case before it was "like rearranging the deck
chairs on the titanic"-with ''no net gain or loss by either party, except in attorney fees and costs
to argue a rather esoteric legal issue." Id. at 5-6. This Court rejected that analysis, directing courts
to focus on the result of the action-not prelitigation conduct or other facts outside the simple
analysis of whether a party got what it wanted as aresuh of the 1awsuit. Id. at 6.
Like Medical Recovery, "the Clarkes raised a single claitn, presenting a single issue

. .,

there were no counterclaims." Id. The Clarkes had to slog all the way through a bench trial before
receiving the ''relief on their claim." See id. at 4, 6. Medical Recovery got what it wanted after

filing its complaint-without the expense of contested proceedings on the merits. (E.g., R.15, 32,
81.) Rather than credit Medical Recovery's success "in the action,'' I.R. C.P. 54(d)(I )(B) (emphasis
added), the lower col.ll1s faulted Medical Recovery for its purported 1ack of prelitigation
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"diligence." (See R. 117-18, 334--35.) But prelitigation diligence "does not fall within the
considerations required by Rule 54(d)(l)(B)." Clarke, 165 Idaho at 6, 437 P.3d at 6.

2.

Sound policy supports the rule's focus on the action.

There's good reason to prohibit consideration of factors outside the straightforward
assessment of who prevailed on the claims in the case. It means judges don't have to decide
whether the legal issue is "esoteric" or the relief no more than ''rearranging the deck chairs on the
Titanic." See id. Judges often lack important information about facts outside the record of the
pending litigation over which they preside: whether those facts are the existence or non-existence
of a spouse's separate property, id., or a party's prelitigation efforts to settle a dispute, (R. 11718, 334--35.).
Litigating these extra-recordissues in attorney fee disputes would be a nightmare. Attorney
fees are often much of the relief sought in an action. If facts outside the resuh of the action are
relevant to deciding who prevailed, you can expect parties to conduct discovery and request
judicial fact fmding on these matters. Because the only relevance of this material would be the
attorney fee issue, parties would need additional evidentiary hearings to prove the limited effect
of the judgment or a party's lackofprelitigation diligence. Idaho law rightly rejects these inquiries,
directing courts to consider success ''in the action." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). The Court should reverse
the District Court and remand for a decision on the reasonable amount of Medical Recovery's fees

and costs.

1

?
Settlement efforts are off limits in the prevailing party analysis.

Not on1y is prelitigation conduct generally out of bounds in the prevailing party analysis,
denying fees because a party did not diligently work to settle the dispute also conflicts with this
Court's precedent. Evidence of settlement negotiations "is not admissible-on behalf of any
party---either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim . . ." I.R.E. 408.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
4836-9882-1301 v3

10

This Court gives Rule 408 a "broad, not narrow, .interpretation .in order to encourage settlement
negotiations." Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,495,

224 P .3d 1068, 1084 (2009).
The Court has gone so far as to say that parties have ''no duty .. _ to conduct reasonable
settlement negotiations" and courts have ''no authority to impose sanctions for 'bad faith'
[settlement] bargaining." Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 276,
824 P.2d 841, 851 (1991) (second aheration in original) (quoting Ross v. Coleman Co., 114 Idaho
817, 836, 761 P.2d 1169, 1188 (1988). Indeed, in Ross v. Coleman Co., the court awarded the
plaintiff attorney fees "in substantial part upon its fmding that the defense counsel had failed to
conduct settlement negotiations in good faith." 114 Idaho at 836, 761 P .2d at 1188. This Court
reversed holding "there is no authority in a trial court to insist upon, oversee, or second guess
settlement negotiations, if any . . .. " Id. Here, the lower courts denied fees because Medical
Recover purportedly failed to engage Gepford in adequate prelitigation settlement efforts. (R. 11718, 334--35.) That's not allowed under the Ross rule. Id.

This is a bright line rule. The ''validity or amount of a disputed" attorney fee claiin does
not turn on the contents or quality of settlement efforts. I.RE. 408; Ross, 114 Idaho at 836, 761
P .2d at 1188. This rule fosters a degree of openness, candor, and willingness to bargain that would

be destroyed if parties knew they might later be litigating over settlement negotiations.
If the legislature intends to depart from this rule, it does so expressly. See Idaho Code§ 12-

120(1) (allowing attorney fees in cases seeking $35,000 or less only if there is a ''written demand
for payment ... not less than ten (10) days before the commencement of the action" and barring
fees when ''the defendant tender[s] to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an
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amount at least equal to ninety-fwe (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff'). Rule
54(d)(l)(B) Jacks this exception, as does Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

In sum, the rules of evidence, this Court's precedent, and sound policy reject Gepford' s
argument that Medical Recovery can be denied prevailing party status because it didn't engage
Gepford in prelitigation settlement efforts. The Court should reverse the District Court and remand
for decision on the reasonable amount of fees.

/ · L{_ Even if 2re litigation conduct mattered, substantial evide nee does nots nru,ort
the lower courts' finding that Medical Recovery was not diligent. Gepford
knewofthe bill and would not pay until MedicalRecovecysued.
Even if the prelitigation settlement efforts could be considered, Gepford is not the
sympathetic, unknowing debtor he claims to be. The record is undisputed that Gepford got the
original bill from his medical provider (R. 116.) Medical Recovery sent every prelitigation notice
to the same address on the original bill Gepford admits he received. ( Compare R. 35 (identifying
Gepford's address on the medical bill as 538 E. Holliday, Pocatello, ID 83201 ), with R. 135
(showing Gepford's address in Medical Recovery's business records as 538 E. Holliday, Pocatello,
ID 83201), andR. 130 (identifying Medical Recovery's testimony that this was the address used
for prelitigation notices and that none were returned undeliverable)). The Magistrate Court's
contrary conclusion rested exclusively on evidence that a post litigation notice was sent to "538
West Holliday" and was returned. (R. 116, R. 62 (identifying an August 2, 2016 letter sent after
the complaint was filed that was returned ''No such number").) None of the pre-litigation notices
were returned in the mail (R. 130.) What's more, Gepford called Medical Recovery before the
lawsuit-refusing to pay the bill and swearing at Medical Recovery's employees. (See R. 138) So
he must have received the prelitigation notices Medical Recovery sent. When asked about the call
during the litigation, Gepford didn't deny it-saying only he couldn't remember. (Transcript R.
Vol I at p. 22, Tr. 24:8-25 (''Like I said, I do not -- like I said, I cannot stand on that, whether or
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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not I received a phone call or not from him.").) Even after paying the bill, Gepford's briefmg below
shows that he rejected Medical Recovery's attempt to settle-insisting on litigating the attorney
fee issue. (See R. 72. ).
There's no substantiai competent evidence to support the lower courts' fmding that
Medical Recovery exhibited a "lack of diligence in this matter prior to filing suit." (Resp't Br. at
13; R. 117-18, 334-35.) The Court should reverse, even if it gets into the issue of Medical
Recovery's diligence.
II.

IDAHO CODE § 12-120(3) PROVIDES ATTORNEY FEES TO THE PREVAILING PARTY IN
CASES TO RECOVER ON UNPAID SERVICE CONTRACTS.

Gepford' s right that this case doesn't involve a commercial transaction under Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3). (Resp't Br. at 24-27.) But that doesn't matter. Decades of judicial precedent and the

plain language of the statute make clear that fee shifting is mandatory in cases to recover on a
services contract. The Court should reaffirm this precedent and reverse.

A.

This isn't a new issue. Longstanding precedent autbori7.es attorney fees in
cases to collect on service contracts under§ 12-120(3).

For decades, Idaho like other states, has allowed fee shifting in cases to collect unpaid
services contracts. E.g., Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 200, 774 P.2d 909,
910 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that section 12-120(3) "authoriz.es ... a fee award'' in a case to
collect unpaid legal services-without reference to the connnercial transaction portion of the
statute, but concluding that a pro se attorney does not qualify for fees); see also Calnan, 2018 OK
60, 427 P .3d at 1052 n. 5 (quoting Oklahoma's fee shifting statute with similar language to
Idaho's). 6

6

Cf Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857, 860, 727 P .2d 1285, 1288 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding (before

the legislature enacted the "commercial transaction" language) that§ 12-120 "mandates an award
of attorney fees ... to the prevailing party in acivil action brought to recover on anote"), abrogated
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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As recently as 2018, the Court has reaffnmed this rule in the medical services contextwithout ana]yzing whether the transaction had a commercial purpose. Med. Recovery Servs., I.LC

v. Neumeier, 163 Idaho 504, 513 (2018) ("In this case, [Medical Recovery] brought its action to
recover on a bill arising from a contract for medical services. Thus, Neumeier is entitled to fees
under section 12-120(3) as the prevailing party.").
What's more, the Idaho Court of Appeals analyz.ed and rejected Gepford's argwnent that

medical services contracts must involve a commercial transaction to qualify for attorney fees under
Idaho Code § 12-120(3). In Eriksen v. Blue Cross ofIdaho Health Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 693,
695, 778 P.2d 815, 817 (Ct. App. 1989), the defendant argued ''that the statute's reference to
'services' [was] limited by the subsequent mention of a 'commercial transaction."' Id. The Court
disagreed. Applying the canons of ''parity of construction" and avoiding "surplusage," the Court
held ''the Legislature put the term 'commercial transaction' in this statute, not to narrow its scope,
but to extend its coverage to litigation arising from commercial disputes as well as from certain
non-commercial disputes." Id. ''This intent is evinced by the Legis1ature's use of the conjwictive
phrase "and in any commercial transaction." Id. (emphasis in original).
As fin1her evidenced below, both this Court and the Court of Appea1s have had this right
for more than thirty years-there's no reason to upend the apple cart now. The District Court
should be reversed.

B.

The text of§ 12-120(3) also supports attorney fee awards in actions to collect
on unpaid service contracts.

Gepford purports to grolllld his interpretation the plain Janguage of the statute-asserting
that Medical Recovery's reading requires a statutory re-write. (Resp't Br. at 28.) The opposite is

on other grounds by BECO Const. Co. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294,233 P.3d 1216
(2010).
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true. Gepford and the lower courts re-wrote the statute, not Medical Recovery. As the Court of
Appeals held more than thirty years ago, the statute mandates fee shifting in "certain noncommercial disputes" and in "litigation arising from commercial disputes." Eriksen, 116 Idaho at
695, 778 P .2d at 817. The statute reads:

In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated,
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating
to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,merchandise, orservices
and in any connnercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee
to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (emphasis added). The verb "to recover'' is followed first by the
preposition "on" and later by the preposition "in." See id. "[O]n" modifies the first set of listed
transactions, allowing fees "to recover on an open account, accollllt stated, note, bill, negotiable
instrument, guaranty, or contract reJating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or
services." Id. The preposition "in" modifies the second category-suits "to recover ... in any
commercial transaction." Id. The conjunctive "and" (highlighted above) makes clear that the
"commercial transaction" language is a second added category of claims eligible for statutory fee
shifting. Eriksen, 116 Idaho at 695, 778 P.2dat 817.
Gepford' s reading renders the second preposition "in" surplusage. It also conflicts with the
statute's expansive additive language: "and in any." See Idaho Code § 12-120(3). If the Legislature
intended to limit the scope of the statute, you'd expect a limiting phrase like "only in commercial
transactions" rather than "and in any commercial transaction." See id.
Thus, Gepford's argument (adopted by the lower courts) creates surplusage and conflicts
with the statute's plain language. This Comt should reverse. Ada Cty. Prosecuting Attorney v. 2007

Legendary Motorcycle, 154 Idaho 351, 353, 298 P .3d 245, 247 (2013) (''The interpretation of a
statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain,
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usua~ and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not

ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written."' (quoting
Verska v. SaintAlphonsus Reg '!Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011)).
Ill.

MEDICAL RECOVERY SHOUID BE GRANTED REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEFS ON APPFAL

This Cow1 "may award reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the effort to secure a
reasonable amount of attorney fees." BECO Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs Inc., 149 Idaho 294,298

(2010), overruled on other grounds by Keybank Nat'/ Ass'n v. PAL I, LLC, 155 Idaho 287, 311 P.3d 299
(2013 ). Because Medical Recovery prevailed below, sought attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3),

(E.g., R. 84, 95, 98, 335), and meets the criteria for a statutory award offees, this Court should also grant
fees on appeal. Gepford relies on a line of cases addressing a different provision of the statute: Idaho Code

§ 12-120(5), efforts to collect ajudgment. (Resp't Br. at 32.) This isn't a judgment collection case.
Medical Recovery sued for payment of a debt, and this appeal arises from the denial of attorney
fees in that widerlying action. As the prevailing party on a claim to recover on an unpaid medical
services contract, the Court should grant Medical Recovery attorney fees on appeal Idaho Code§
12-120(3).

CONCLUSION
Medical Recovery prevailed. As a prevailing party on a c1aim to recover an unpaid medical
services contract, Medical Recovery is entitled to costs as of right and attorney fees under Idaho
Code § 12-120(3). The Court should reverse the District Court and remand for determination of
the reasonable amount of fees-both below and on appeal
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DATED this 5th day of March 2020.
PARSONSBEHLE & LATIMER

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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